GRADUATE SCHOOL EDUCATION AS A RETENTION AND READINESS TOOL by Donovan, Mark A. & Sweet, Kevin S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-12
GRADUATE SCHOOL EDUCATION AS A
RETENTION AND READINESS TOOL
Donovan, Mark A.; Sweet, Kevin S.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64140
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








GRADUATE SCHOOL EDUCATION AS A RETENTION 
AND READINESS TOOL 
by 
Mark A. Donovan and Kevin S. Sweet 
December 2019 
Thesis Advisor: Robert W. Tomlinson 
Second Reader: Robert E. Burks 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
GRADUATE SCHOOL EDUCATION AS A RETENTION AND READINESS 
TOOL
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Mark A. Donovan and Kevin S. Sweet
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) recently identified a retention problem 
among Special Forces Captains. A USASOC-sponsored survey sent to all active duty Special Forces 
Captains highlighted that many are considering leaving the Army at a crucial point, leaving the force 
depleted in terms of both quantity and quality of field grade officers; the same survey, however, also 
revealed the solution. Of the 163 respondents, there was a significant interest for increased civilian graduate 
school opportunities. While previous analysts provided broad suggestions to increase retention, this thesis 
specifically examines the solution of increased civilian graduate school opportunities. By analyzing the 
survey results as well as the recent Army directive regarding Command General Staff College attendance, 
this thesis finds that, to retain the most talented officers and ensure the continued readiness of the members 
of the 1st Special Forces Command, USASOC must improve its talent management by leveraging the most 
recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to offer graduate school education as a means of 
retaining its top-performing Captains. Doing so aligns with the 2018 National Defense Strategy guidance to 
ensure strong critical thinkers and problem solvers. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
talent management, readiness, graduate education, United States Army Special Operations 





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
GRADUATE SCHOOL EDUCATION AS A RETENTION  
AND READINESS TOOL 
Mark A. Donovan 
Major, United States Army 
BS, Eastern Kentucky University, 2008 
 
Kevin S. Sweet 
Major, United States Army 
BA, Northern Arizona University, 2008 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS  
(IRREGULAR WARFARE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2019 
Approved by: Robert W. Tomlinson 
 Advisor 
 Robert E. Burks 
 Second Reader 
 Kalev I. Sepp 
 Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) recently identified a 
retention problem among Special Forces Captains. A USASOC-sponsored survey sent to 
all active duty Special Forces Captains highlighted that many are considering leaving the 
Army at a crucial point, leaving the force depleted in terms of both quantity and quality 
of field grade officers; the same survey, however, also revealed the solution. Of the 163 
respondents, there was a significant interest for increased civilian graduate school 
opportunities. While previous analysts provided broad suggestions to increase retention, 
this thesis specifically examines the solution of increased civilian graduate school 
opportunities. By analyzing the survey results as well as the recent Army directive 
regarding Command General Staff College attendance, this thesis finds that, to retain the 
most talented officers and ensure the continued readiness of the members of the 1st 
Special Forces Command, USASOC must improve its talent management by leveraging 
the most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to offer graduate school 
education as a means of retaining its top-performing Captains. Doing so aligns with the 
2018 National Defense Strategy guidance to ensure strong critical thinkers and problem 
solvers. 
v 
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In 2018, the Special Forces Regiment Future Readiness Officer designed an 
anonymous workforce sentiment survey and distributed it to every Year Group (YG) 2009, 
2010, and 2011 SF Captain on active duty. The survey results confirmed what the Special 
Forces Branch had already noted: the number of Special Forces Captains considering 
leaving or choosing to leave military service negatively affects the retention rate of Special 
Forces Captains commonly referred to as 18As. Importantly, over the past year, Special 
Forces Captain positions throughout the Special Forces Regiment have already routinely 
been filled at only 70% capacity, leaving almost one out of every three Operational 
Detachment Alphas (ODA) without a Detachment Commander. If left unchecked, this 
failure to retain captains would likely affect not only individual ODAs, but also the quality 
of senior officers within the Special Forces Regiment. The retention problem is now being 
addressed at higher levels. However, with the recent directive to lessen rather than increase 
civilian graduate school opportunities for officers, the Army might be going in the wrong 
direction. Fortunately, the same survey may demonstrate a solution.  
A Designing for Defense team—a substituent element of Hacking for Defense— 
from the University of Colorado at Boulder—reviewed the survey results and identified 
multiple reasons for Special Forces Captains decisions to leave the military. A short 
amount of time on an ODA as a Commander, a lack of mentorship from senior officers, 
and an overwhelming aversion to attending the United States Army Command and General 
Staff College (CGSC) to receive Advanced Operational Credit (AOC) all showed as 
significant. Multiple captains described how more time on an ODA, more proactive 
relationships with senior officers, and more opportunities to receive AOC, as well as a 
master’s degree, would have made or make them more likely to remain in the Army. 
The 1st Special Forces Command recently enacted a significant change in the 
timeline of its Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), so that it can now be completed 
in under one year, which may increase the regiment’s ability to retain its officers. A shorter 
amount of time in the SFQC will increase the time that a Special Forces Captain serves 
during his first tour of the Special Forces Regiment from four years to five and a half years. 
xiv 
This additional time may allow Special Forces Captains to serve on an ODA for longer 
than the average 18–24 months currently experienced. Additionally, senior officers will 
have more time and a better opportunity to get to know their captains and provide more 
mentorship. Finally, Special Forces Captains can use the longer timeline on their first tour 
of a Special Forces Group to earn higher-level civilian education, or a master’s degree, 
through the application of a Graduate School Additional Service Obligation (GRADSO). 
The 1st Special Forces Command, therefore, finally has the opportunity to address the 
largest grievances of its Captains; now it simply needs to move forward and seize that 
opportunity. 
This thesis analyzes survey results and the recent directive regarding mandatory 
minimum attendance at CGSC to provide recommendations on retention of Special Forces 
Captains to improve both quantity and quality of force readiness in a near-peer threat 
environment. The thesis finds that increased civilian education opportunities, specifically 
revisions to the GRADSO program, may well help increase retention of Special Forces 
Captains.  
1 
I. OFFICER RETENTION WITHIN THE SPECIAL FORCES 
REGIMENT 
Charged with conducting numerous and varied combat and non-combat operations 
in support of U.S. policies and objectives, the United States Army Special Forces (SF) 
Regiment1 is among the most elite Special Operations (SO) groups, a critical element for 
U.S. national defense and security. For almost two decades, Special Forces Groups have 
deployed continuously in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducting operations that 
support U.S. interests worldwide. With ongoing conflict and instability in Syria and 
growing threats from near-peer adversaries, the Special Forces Regiment likely will 
continue to be consistently employed at a high operational tempo and remains a vital U.S. 
asset.  
To continue to meet mission, the Special Forces Regiment must, therefore, take 
action to meet internal retention challenges. Active Duty Enlisted (ADE) and Active Duty 
Officer (ADO) numbers have fallen below the threshold of needs for a healthy Regiment. 
Within the U.S. military, the “18” series refers to special forces and “A” indicates officers, 
so that 18A refers to a Special Forces Officer. Of particular concern, according to the July 
2019 monthly Special Forces Branch Update, over the last 13 months, the 18A Captain 
positions within the Regiment were routinely filled to only 70% of the captains-to-position 
rate.2   
A lack of Captains within the Special Forces Regiment has been an ongoing 
concern. In 2018, the Special Forces Regiment Future Readiness Officer designed an 
anonymous workforce sentiment survey and distributed it to every Year Group (YG) 2009, 
2010, and 2011 SF Captain on active duty.3 One hundred and sixty three officers 
responded, and a Designing for Defense team—a substituent element of Hacking for 
                                                 
1 The 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) is made up of Special Forces, Psychological Operations, 
and Civil Affairs Soldiers. This thesis refers specifically to Special Forces Soldiers within the 1st Special 
Forces Command (Airborne) and, therefore, will refer them as the Special Forces Regiment throughout.  
2 A.W. Simmons, “A Special Report on SF Talent Management,” Human Resources Command 
Special Forces Branch Update (01 July 2019): 1. 
3 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 5. 
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Defense (H4D)—from the University of Colorado at Boulder reviewed the results to 
provide recommendations for improved retention among Special Forces Captains.4  The 
H4D study provides a broad understanding of why such a high number of Special Forces 
Captains are choosing to leave military service at the conclusion of their detachment 
leadership time. Although the results naturally varied, improving the Special Forces 
Regiment’s ability to conduct Talent Management (TM)—which this thesis defines as the 
ability to recognize, organize, and award talent appropriately—showed as the key to 
improving retention and, therefore, ensuring the ability to meet mission.  
While the survey showed the problems, it also inherently contains a potential 
solution, which is the subject of this thesis. Crucially, by leveraging the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), the Special Forces Regiment can offer advanced civilian 
education opportunities to its most highly talented Captains. By doing so, the Special 
Forces Regiment may be able to increase retention as well as the overall talent at the field 
grade officer level and beyond.  
A. WHY CAPTAINS? 
This thesis focuses on how to potentially retain Captains, rather than other levels of 
officers, within the Special Forces Regiment for several reasons. As of the writing, officers 
who have not yet reached the rank of Captain are not accepted into the Special Forces 
Assessment and Selection (SFAS) although a tentative proposal to change this standard 
exists. Officers who have been promoted to Major have already passed the ten-year mark 
in their military career, making highly unlikely the prospect of their leaving the military 
before a twenty-year period. Captains, however, have much more flexibility. The typical 
Special Forces Captain has ten years of military service at the conclusion of the first tour 
of a Special Forces Group. The decision to leave the military and pursue other educational 
and career opportunities at the natural transition point of ten years is still very feasible 
because the service obligation accrued upon graduation of the Special Forces Qualification 
Course (SFQC) is complete. Special Forces Captains, on average, have served for 
                                                 
4 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 5. 
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approximately four years in the conventional Army and have received over 18 months of 
specialized training during the SFQC. When a Special Forces Captain chooses to leave the 
military, the Army not only loses an officer with a wealth of experience, but it also loses a 
massive investment of time and financial resources. Perhaps most importantly, the inability 
to retain the most talented captains would likely eventually result in the reduction in quality 
of more senior Special Forces officers, thus weakening the Regiment. By strengthening its 
retention efforts of Captains, the Special Forces Regiment can ensure that a greater number 
of talented officers choose to stay in the Army at this crucial decision point in their careers.  
B. POTENTIAL INITIATIVES TO FIX THE RETENTION PROBLEM 
The Special Forces Branch identified a particularly dangerous trend in the strength 
of Special Forces Captains pertaining to Officer Year Groups 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 
20135 and sought both internal and external solutions. The historically low number of 
officers to apply for and complete SF training in these year groups exacerbated the problem 
of an already low retention rate of Captains. Internally, the Regiment is now paying close 
attention to several initiatives that have arisen from the NDAA for fiscal year (FY) 2019. 
Externally, scholarly research such as the H4D study as well as this thesis has identified 
reasons for low retention among SF Captains as well as possible solutions. 
1. U.S. Army Special Operations Command Talent Management 
Initiatives 
In May 2019, the Special Forces Branch unveiled several initiatives to increase the 
regiment’s talent pool. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
is seeking to spearhead the use of FY2019 NDAA changes to reflect the Army Special 
Operation Forces’s (ARSOF) specific challenges. However, the following congressionally-
approved initiatives have not been approved by the Army. For example, USASOC is 
exploring options to include an alternative promotion system, a promotion opt-out, and a 
direct commission option. An alternative promotion authority may enable the Special 
Forces Regiment to open SFAS to First Lieutenants, thus expanding the number of 
                                                 
5 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 1. 
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available officers able to enter the branch.6  The NDAA also has authorized a promotion 
opt-out, which could allow Special Forces Captains to opt-out of promotion to Major, 
allowing them more time on an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA).7 Finally, the direct 
commission up to O-68  could be used to directly commission officers who had previously 
separated from military service, completed additional civilian education, and then desired 
to return as Majors. These initiatives may very well increase the number of available 
officers within the SF Regiment, but would likely have little impact on retaining the 
Captains already in the organization. The promotion opt-out does answer some of the main 
concerns reflected in the survey, specifically, the limited amount of time captains have to 
serve as detachment commanders. However, this initiative may have the opposite desired 
effect, decreasing retention by encouraging top officers to separate to attend higher level 
civilian education or pursue other professional career paths, knowing that they can always 
reenter the army if they choose. Additionally, the promotion opt-out may negatively affect 
the quality of officers available to fill O4 major billets, thus not solving the problem.  
2. Hacking for Defense  
Several scholars from the University of Colorado at Boulder conducted the H4D 
study, examining the specific problem set of low retention among Special Forces Captains 
by interviewing over 40 personnel throughout the Special Forces Regiment as well as 
analyzing the USASOC sponsored survey of 163 active duty Special Forces Captains.9 
After analyzing the issue over a 15-week period, the H4D authors identified five broad 
solutions to retain more Special Forces Captains.10  The suggested solutions for the Special 
Forces Regiment include: supporting a more human-centric culture; improving 
understanding through data collection; closing the communication gap; improving human 
                                                 
6 Mac Thornberry, John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019 
(Washington, DC, 2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5515/text. 
7 Thornberry, National Defense Authorization Act. 
8 Thornberry, National Defense Authorization Act. 
9 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management (University of 
Colorado, Boulder, CO). 
10 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 8. 
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capital management structures; and implementing programs to improve career choices.11  
While the H4D study highlighted specific issues that Special Forces Captains have cited as 
reasons for considering leaving or having chosen to leave the Regiment, its suggested 
solutions are extremely broad. This thesis’s researchers agree with the H4D researchers on 
all of their main points regarding how the regiment can change the current culture from 
within to address some of the concerns they currently face. Simultaneously, we believe that 
a more direct approach to increasing retention would be to use civilian education 
opportunities to entice Special Forces Captains to continue serving, thus expanding the 
capability of field grade officers as well as creating more refined problem solvers while 
also potentially retaining top talented Captains.  
C. WHY RETENTION IS FAILING AMONG SF CAPTAINS 
The H4D study identified multiple reasons that Special Forces Captains are leaving 
or considering whether to leave the regiment and the Army. A large number of Special 
Forces Captains noted an aversion to attending the U.S. Army’s conventional Command 
and General Staff College (CGSC) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.12 This aversion has to 
do with Special Forces Officers’ desire to instead attend non-conventional Intermediate 
Level Education (ILE), such as the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), sister service, 
foreign military, and civilian higher education institutions. Of note, beginning in 2020, a 
smaller number of Special Forces Officers will be permitted to attend NPS, exacerbating 
many Special Forces Captains’ dismay.  
The survey shows specific reasons for the aversion. Many surveyed Special Forces 
Captains highlighted the fact that the CGSC does not award a master’s degree upon 
completion of its curriculum.13 Second, attending CGSC means a limited amount of time 
in command of an ODA.14  The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) 
                                                 
11 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 4–5. 
12 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 25. 
13 A.W. Simmons, Green Beret O-3 Talent Management – FEB19 Survey (U.S. Army Special 
Operations Center of Excellence, 2019), 29. 
14 Simmons, Green Beret O-3 Talent Management – FEB19 Survey, 32. 
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of 1980 standardized officer personnel management across the military services,15 creating 
a uniform timeline among officers, which, in turn, limits the amount of time a Special 
Forces Captain may spend in command. A recent initiative by Major General Sonntag, the 
previous Commander of the 1st Special Warfare Command, to significantly shorten the 
duration of the SFQC has the potential to solve this timeline dilemma as it would allow 
Special Forces Captains to serve on average over five years at a Special Forces Group as 
compared to the previous average of four years.16  This additional operations time would 
provide the possibility for additional civilian education as well as a better opportunity for 
Special Forces leadership to conduct TM.      
D. TALENT MANAGEMENT (TM) AND EDUCATION – A BETTER WAY 
TM is the key to solving the Special Forces Regiment’s dilemma. As stated 
previously, the Regiment is responsive to solutions from internal as well as external 
sources. The H4D survey results overwhelmingly identified Captains’ desire for greater 
freedom in choosing a non-traditional ILE venue, attaining a master’s degree, and spending 
more time in Command of an ODA. This thesis examines how the Regiment can better 
support its Captains through the provision of higher education targeted at the most qualified 
performers within the Regiment. For this model to function properly, the Special Forces 
Regiment must leverage the NDAA and NDS to fund post-graduate education for its most 
talented Captains to, in turn, retain quality officers and positively impact the Regiment’s 
future senior leaders. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 For as long as nation states have gone to battle against each other, thinkers have 
written about how to improve armies. U.S. history shows that armies that are capable and 
willing to evolve often end up continuing while those that fail to evolve often cease to exist. 
For example, the Germans ability to clearly see the benefits of the Blitzkrieg method of 
warfare very nearly resulted in the total annihilation of Europe during WWII, but, because 
                                                 
15 Tim Kane, Total Volunteer Force (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2017): 43. 
16 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 2.  
7 
the United States and other Allied nations embraced new and experimental technology, 
Hitler was stopped. Writers have extensively considered the improvement of technology 
during WWII and continuing through the rest of the 20th century. However, the research 
does not delve as far into how a military, and the U.S. military specifically, could evolve 
its way of thinking about managing talent. The following literature review, therefore, 
examines the existing applicable literature and how this thesis addresses relevant gaps.  
A body of literature does exist regarding how the U.S. military has reorganized 
itself. Much of this literature is macro level, such as the shift to an all-volunteer force after 
the Vietnam War. Some authors, typically former military officers, have also written about 
the need for a better talent management process within the U.S. military. In his Accessing 
Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corp Strategy, Casey Wardynski strongly 
advocates for competing with the civilian labor market by improving current methods of 
officer retention.17 Another former-military-officer-turned-author, Tim Kane, wrote 
several books illuminating the deficiencies within the U.S. military officer talent 
management process. Like Wardynski, Kane heavily references changing market dynamics 
in his assessment. He also focuses on the same areas as the vast majority of other authors 
on the subject: promotions, pensions, and the need for peer evaluations.18 This thesis’s 
researchers agree that the U.S. military’s promotion system may indeed be outdated 
considering that very little incentive to outperform peers exists when officers continue to 
be promoted according to year group, rather than by performance. We also agree that peer 
evaluations may shine a brighter light on specific officers’ competency where the 
evaluations of a senior officer may miss the daily performance of said officer. However, 
we believe that the recent change from only one 20-year retirement structure to a system 
allowing Soldiers to depart after a single term of service with a financial incentive may, in 
fact, lead to more Soldiers leaving the military sooner, adding to the retention problem.  
                                                 
17 Casey Wardynski,  Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U.S. Army Corp Strategy (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010): 36. 
18 Tim Kane, Total Volunteer Force (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2017): 110. 
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What is most lacking in the current retention literature, especially when it comes to 
Special Forces Captains, are specific steps to ensure that the most competent officers 
receive rewards and recognition for their efforts. The current restructuring of the SFQC 
sets the stage for a stronger TM system across Special Forces, especially as pertains to 
Special Forces Captains. This thesis, therefore, resources and cites extensively from 
documents originating from within the 1st Special Forces Command as well as surveys and 
studies focusing on how to retain Special Forces Captains. The thesis uses previous 
Commander of the 1st Special Forces Command MG Kurt Sonntag’s USAJFKSWCS Group 
Update to help the reader visualize the SFQC restructuring.19  Former Green Beret A.W. 
Simmons’s work has also been instrumental in this thesis’s work. His dedication to 
understanding why Green Beret Captains are exiting the Army in such large numbers 
proved essential in understanding Captains’ motives for remaining or leaving the service.20 
University of Colorado graduate students Dan Warner, Geoffrey Lord, Ricardo Zorce, 
Thomas Karas, and Vincent Wroble developed several broad recommendations for 
retaining Special Forces Captains after reviewing the survey created by A.W. Simmons. 
Warner’s study hinted at several recommendations developed further in this thesis, such as 
creating a stronger officer counseling system as well as paying greater attention to Special 
Forces Captains’ desire to attend non-traditional military, ILE, master’s degree producing 
institutions.21 
Previous researchers have also paid significant attention to the benefits of 
competent talent management within military organizations. Former NPS graduate Brian 
Cook described how the Army could look towards civilian companies such as General 
Electric and mimic policies on accession, development, retention, and employment.22  
                                                 
19 Kurt L. Sonntag, USAJFKSWCS Group Update (U.S. Army Special Operations Center of 
Excellence, 2019). 
20 A.W. Simmons, Green Beret O-3 Talent Management – FEB19 Survey (U.S. Army Special 
Operations Center of Excellence, 2019). 
21 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management (University of 
Colorado, Boulder, CO). 




However, the utilization of education as a tool in retaining Special Operations or other 
officers has mainly been written about by students in the process of attaining higher 
education themselves. Theses from military and civilian higher educational institutions 
serve as important sources and are referenced throughout this thesis. Of note, a former 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) student, Gregory Branigan,  published a thesis entitled, 
“The Effect of Graduate Education on the Retention and Promotion of Marine Corps 
Officers,” in which he forcefully argued that the attainment of a post-graduate degree 
positively affects the retainment and promotion of Navy and Marine Corps Officers.23  
Branigan’s argument and underlying research clearly align with this thesis’s hypothesis 
that education is a retention and readiness tool for Special Forces Captains.  
 Researchers who have researched and attempted to solve the U.S. military’s 
retention and TM problems certainly help spotlight an important and wide-ranging issue. 
However, the peculiarities and complexities of the First Special Forces Command and 
specifically the 18A Special Force Officer retention problem require the attention of 
Special Forces personnel. Those that truly relate to and appreciate the experiences of 
SFODA members and the Captains who command them are most likely to solve this riddle. 
Having identified the research gap in previous literature regarding Captains, this thesis 
intends to provide more applicable recommendations.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN  
Following Chapter I’s introduction to the problem of Special Forces Captains 
leaving the Regiment at an alarming rate, which will eventually dilute or even decimate the 
quality of senior Special Forces Commanders, Chapter II describes how the new timeline 
for producing qualified SF Captains, combined with the additional time on an ODA, may 
contribute to a better TM process. The H4D study highlighted numerous instances in which 
Special Forces Captains felt that they were treated as simply numbers with very little ability 
to impact their own careers. Verbal and written counseling between senior and junior 
officers has often been conducted minimally or not at all. Unfortunately, a lack of 
                                                 
23 Gregory A. Branigan, “The effect of graduate education on the retention and promotion of Marine 
Corps officers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate school, 2001), v,  https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/
handle/10945/10846/ada390776.pdf?sequence=1&isallowed=y 
10 
communication between junior and senior officers has led to a mismatch in future jobs and 
career opportunities, contributing to many Special Forces Captains exiting the Army. 
However, the shortening of the SFQC and the additional time that Captains would spend 
with a Special Forces Group may positively affect TM. Chapter III introduces our model, 
revamping the GRADSO option and using education as an incentive for retaining the top 
achievers within the Regiment. Chapter IV presents reflections and recommendations.  
11 
II. OVERVIEW OF TALENT MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE 
SPECIAL FORCES REGIMENT 
Following Chapter I’s introduction of the Special Forces Captain retention 
problem, Chapter II provides a general understanding of the three main concerns that 
Special Forces Captains have given as reasons for leaving the Army: the need for additional 
operational time during a Captain’s first tour of a SF Group, the desire for increased ability 
to earn civilian higher education, and the requirement for increased mentorship. It then 
addresses how an increased amount of time during a Special Forces Captain’s first tour of 
an SF Group may alleviate those concerns.  
On June 1, 2019, MG Sonntag’s long overdue initiative to shorten the length of the 
SFQC went into effect, significantly reducing the course’s length, as well as the length of 
SFAS. On average, captains will now be able to complete SFAS and the SFQC in under a 
year, compared to the previous timeline of two years.24  This reduced training timeline 
gives the Special Forces Regiment the potential to address all three of the top reasons 
identified by its Captains as contributing factors in leaving the Regiment. First, the 
additional operational time that Captains will now have during their initial tour with a 
Special Forces Group may be utilized to obtain a civilian master’s degree from a desirable 
and accredited university. Second, the additional time at Group will allow Captains to 
develop closer, more personal relationships with senior officers. These relationships, along 
with a greater command emphasis on officer counseling, serve two purposes: helping 
commanders to identify their top performers and giving field grade officers the ability to 
counsel captains, impressing upon them the possibility of desirable jobs within the Special 
Forces Regiment post-ODA Command. Finally, the additional time during a captain’s first 
tour of a Special Forces Group may allow him to serve as a Detachment Commander longer 
than the current average of 18–24 months.  
                                                 
24 Kurt L. Sonntag, USAJFKSWCS Group Update (U.S. Army Special Operations Center of 
Excellence, 2019). 
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A. WHY ARE SPECIAL FORCES CAPTAINS LEAVING THE REGIMENT? 
As many reasons exist as there are Green Berets25 for choosing to leave the SF 
Regiment. Family responsibilities as well as personal and professional goals within the 
civilian sector are often incompatible with the lifestyle of a Special Forces Soldier. The 
H4D survey results identified numerous reasons including frustration with military 
bureaucracy, lack of job satisfaction, and family concerns.26 Addressing all of these 
concerns is naturally beyond this thesis’s scope. However, after carefully reviewing the 
individual written responses within the survey, this thesis’s researchers noted three general 
complaints. First, as mentioned in Chapter I, Special Forces Captains often have an 
aversion to attending the CGSC in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The aversion itself has many 
reasons, but, primarily, Captains seem dismayed at the lack of a civilian master’s degree 
earned in conjunction with that institution’s military ILE. Many Captains also reported a 
lack of formal and informal counseling by their raters and senior raters. This lack of 
mentorship contributes to the ignorance among many Special Forces Captains of many of 
the opportunities available for post-ODA Detachment Commanders when they promote to 
Major. Finally, Special Forces Captains want more time on a team. On average, 
Detachment Commanders spend 18–24 months in command of an SFODA. For many, the 
time spent as a Detachment Commander is the pinnacle of their career, thus a strong desire 
exists to increase the operations timeline. 
1. Unappealing Intermediate Level Education Venues and Lack of 
Master’s Degree Options 
a. Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 
Annually, the CGSC provides ILE, through its Command and General Staff School 
(CGSS), to the majority of U.S. Army Majors, including active duty, reserve, National 
Guard, sister service, and interagency personnel.27 The program’s mission states that 
                                                 
25 Special Forces qualified Soldiers and Officers are awarded the distinctive green beret upon 
graduating from the SFQC, and are therefore, often referred to as “Green Berets.” 
26 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 8.  
27 “Command and General Staff School (CGSS),” United States Army Combined Arms Center, 
Accessed September 3, 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/cgsc/cgss. 
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“CGSS educates field grade officers to be agile, innovative, and adaptive leaders within 
increasingly complex and uncertain environments.”28 However, several surveyed Special 
Forces Captains believe that the conventional nature of a “Big Army” school curriculum, 
along with Soldiers from all branches of the U.S. Army, provides anything but an 
innovative and adaptive education.29 Additionally, the survey indicates Captains’ sense 
that CGSC does not provide an attractive option for obtaining a master’s degree30 since 
the ability to earn a Master’s of Military Art and Sciences Degree at CGSC means an 
additional requirement that students must work towards separately from their ILE 
workload.31 These combined perceptions make this mandatory officer education 
unappealing to many Special Forces Captains, and many indicate desire to attend civilian 
graduate schools instead. Until very recently, the Special Forces Captains operational 
timeline was too short to allow this route. However, the increased operational timeline may 
now allow many of these officers to attend a civilian graduate school before completing 
resident ILE or while completing a satellite ILE course. 
2. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Naval War College  
Since 2008, at NPS, U.S. Army Special Forces Officers have been able to earn a 
coveted master’s degree while simultaneously earning ILE accreditation through the Naval 
War College. However, after FY2020, the U.S. Army will no longer recognize the Naval 
War College Advanced Operational Credit (AOC) at NPS.32 This controversial policy 
change may have been caused by a misunderstanding. A memorandum signed by the 
Secretary of the Army in May 2019 referenced NPS as a program that will no longer be 
accepted for AOC credit starting in Academic Year 21 (AY21).33  However, NPS has never 
                                                 
28 United States Army Combined Arms Center, “Command and General Staff School (CGSS).” 
29 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 8. 
30 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 25. 
31 United States Army Combined Arms Center, “Command and General Staff School (CGSS).” 
32 Mark T. Esper, “Army Directive 2019–19 (Credentialing Intermediate Level Education)” (Official 
memorandum, Washington, DC, Secretary of the Army) 
33 Esper, “Army Directive 2019–19 (Credentialing Intermediate Level Education).” 
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issued AOC credit. Rather, NPS students have received AOC credit through the Naval War 
College, which will continue to provide it.  
If unresolved, this problem, whether a misunderstanding or otherwise, will likely 
create serious consequences for Special Forces Captains attending NPS. For those U.S. 
Army officers that continue to attend NPS, it will be necessary to attend a 12-week ILE 
satellite course at Fort Leavenworth after NPS graduation, lowering the number of Special 
Forces Captains who are able to attend NPS. Additionally, the USASOC has directed that 
51% of all Special Forces Captains on the resident select list for Major must attend CGSC, 
another decision that will reduce the number of Special Forces Captains able to attend NPS.  
3. Officer Counseling within the Special Forces Regiment 
Beyond concern with unappealing ILE venues and program problems, Special 
Forces Captains are also not receiving a sufficient amount of professional development 
from senior Special Forces officers. The H4D analysts noted that numerous Special Forces 
Captains reported a lack of formal and informal counseling by their raters and senior raters 
during their time as Detachment Commanders.34  Although formal counseling is required 
and conducted between Captains and Team Sergeants, as well as between Team Sergeants 
and junior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), formal counseling among officers is 
severely lacking within the Regiment, creating several dilemmas for Detachment 
Commanders. First, they are often unsure of their job security and of where they may end 
up after their time on an ODA. Second, they are often uninformed on what future positions 
are available within the Special Forces Regiment to Majors. Of survey respondents, 49 out 
of 53 Special Forces Captains who plan to exit the Army noted little opportunity to discuss 
their career goals and aspirations and limited mentorship.35  Several of those wrote in their 
personal comments that they did not desire a position within the Special Forces Regiment 
post-Company Command.36 A more formalized counseling system between junior and 
senior officers may serve to alleviate these concerns; more importantly, it would also likely 
                                                 
34 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 19. 
35 Simmons, Green Beret O-3 Talent Management – FEB19, 11. 
36 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 12. 
15 
lead to many senior officers providing accurate information on what opportunities are 
available post-company Command. This information may ease the concerns of many 
Captains who fear being stuck in staff positions for the rest of their careers following a 
Company Command and better educate them on available benefits and opportunities post-
Company Command. 
4. Short Amount of Time as a Detachment Commander 
Prior to June 1, 2019, the duration of the SFQC was anywhere between 18 and 24 
months, possibly longer if a student recycled a phase. Because of DOPMA, which limited 
the amount of time that a Special Forces Captain can be operational before being promoted 
to Major, Special Forces Captains were often on a very tight timeline to graduate from 
SFQC, arrive at Group, command an ODA for 18–24 months, and then get out of the way 
so that the next Captain could replace them. Multiple Captains identified this short amount 
of time on an ODA team as a key reason for leaving the Regiment.37  Several noted that 
the removal of the commander at 24 months does not allow Special Forces officers to gain 
maximum experience at the most important level of leadership within the Regiment.38 
B. HOW MG SONNTAG’S REVAMPED SPECIAL FORCES 
QUALIFICATION COURSE MAY HELP RETAIN SF CAPTAINS 
The condensed SFQC timeline may help the Regiment address its officer retention 
problem. By shortening the total amount of time that a captain spends in the SFAS and 
SFQC to under one year, Special Forces Captains will now have the opportunity to serve 
for over five years during their initial tour at a Special Forces Group.39 The additional time 
on an initial tour may afford Captains the ability to obtain a civilian master’s degree before 
or during their ILE experience. The additional time may also encourage Special Forces 
Captains to develop closer relationships with their rater and senior rater, thus contributing 
to better communication and a more extensive knowledge of future positions within the 
                                                 
37 Simmons, Green Beret O-3 Talent Management – FEB19, 32. 
38 Simmons, Green Beret O-3 Talent Management – FEB19, 32. 
39 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 2. 
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regiment. Finally, additional time at group may equate to additional time commanding an 
SFODA. Figure 1 depicts the new SFQC timeline. 
 
Figure 1. Approved Special Forces Qualification Course Timeline40 
1. More Opportunities to Obtain Master’s Degrees 
The additional time that Special Forces Captains will be able to spend at a Special 
Forces Group will allow top performers to compete for an opportunity to attend higher 
level civilian education, a retention issue noted by an overwhelming number of surveyed 
Captains. Of course, not all Special Forces Captains desire or will be able to attend higher 
level civilian education. Group and Battalion Commanders will be forced to identify early 
                                                 
40 Source: Sonntag, USAJFKSWCS Group Update. 
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those top performers who both deserve and desire this incentive. However, the additional 
time will make it a feasible option. Although most Special Forces Captains do not have the 
exact same experience with the various positions that they fill during their initial Group 
tour, the previous four-year model was very standard, and, normally, a Captain would serve 
for 18–24 months as an ODA Commander. Their third and fourth years were often spent 
at Battalion or Group Operations, as a Company Executive Officer (XO), or as a 
Headquarters Support Company (HSC) Commander. These positions were often 
intermixed, and there were other opportunities to work at one of the Army Training Centers 
such as Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana, or at the National 
Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California. This fairly standard four-year timeline 
then culminated with the Captain reaching a promotable status to Major and leaving the 
Group to attend an ILE venue. The increased timeline will allow Special Forces Captains 
to continue experiencing these important assignments while also allowing top performers 
more room to earn civilian education, further discussed in Chapter III.  
2. More Time at Group May Lead to Better Relationships 
Additionally, the longer timeline will likely permit Special Forces Captains to 
develop closer relationships with their rater, senior rater, and other senior officers. The 5.5-
year timeline will likely ensure that Special Forces Captains meet more senior officers and, 
ideally, develop more substantial relationships with them. These relationships can provide 
Captains with mentorship and guidance including information regarding future 
opportunities. At the bare minimum, the increased communication between Captains and 
senior officers may alleviate the Captains’ career concerns as well as help senior officers 
better identify their top performing Captains. The Special Forces Regiment must take 
advantage of these relationship opportunities and revamp their officer mentorship and 
counseling standards. As stated earlier in this chapter, the H4D analysts noted that 
numerous Captains reported a lack of formal and informal counseling by their raters and 
senior raters during their time as Detachment Commanders.41 The additional time may 
naturally provide the space for Captains to reach out to senior officers; ideally, Group 
                                                 
41 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 19. 
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leadership could develop a formal system of encouraging senior officers to mentor young 
Captains.  
3. More Time on a Team 
Young Army officers who are willing to attend SFAS and then commit to the SFQC 
are most often very driven people, coming from all types of backgrounds including from 
both the public and private sectors. In addition to a shared desire to serve their nation, many 
often join Special Forces in order to command an ODA. The time spent leading an ODA 
is not just more enjoyable than other positions; it is where a Special Forces officer learns 
how ODAs operate and their capacities, essential knowledge for senior officers within the 
Regiment. The greater amount of time that a Captain serves on an ODA directly contributes 
to a greater amount of knowledge going forward into Company and Battalion Command 
positions. With a 5.5-year window, an ODA Commander could remain in that position for 
between 2.5 and 3 years and also attend a civilian graduate school program after his time 
in Command is complete. The additional time on a team will also likely vastly increase an 
ODA Commander’s knowledge and competence at the tactical level, and it will also better 





Following Chapter II’s examination of why Special Forces Captains may choose to 
leave the military, Chapter III focuses on how improving the TM model within the 
Regiment and leveraging the NDAA to fund advanced civilian education opportunities can 
increase retention of talented captains as well as improve force readiness by molding  
refined critical thinkers and problem solvers. This thesis specifically defines force 
readiness as the ability of Special Forces elements from the Group level down to the 
individual ODA level to react to and solve complex problems in a changing world dynamic, 
one that brings near-peer competition and potential peer conflict into the realm of 
possibility, a need highlighted by the 2018 NDS.42 
Special Operations holds it “Truths” dear, and the SOF Truths assert that humans 
are more important than hardware and that quality is more important than quantity.43 If the 
regiment holds these truths as key for success, then using education as a tool to retain 
officers and broaden the way in which young field grade officers approach problem sets 
remains fundamental. In the April 2019 SWCS way ahead and optimization brief, 
Commander MG Sonntag states that “judgment and decision making are paramount, 
therefore the regiment must select those that can operate on tomorrow’s battlefield.”44 
Additionally, he notes that the 1st SFC(A) highest expectation of green berets is to be 
critical thinkers and problem solvers.45 Being a critical thinker and a problem solver is a 
continuous process refined over time through experiences, lessons learned, and furthered 
education. Therefore, expanding the educational opportunities available to SF Captains 
only further supports regiment priorities. Additionally, the NDS specifically calls for TM 
as relates to advanced civilian education: “Developing leaders who are competent in 
                                                 
42 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, D.C.: January 2018). 
43  Collins John “United States and Soviet special operations” CRS 1987  Collins, John, United States 
and Soviet Special Operations, CRS (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1987), 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002771136. 
44 Sonntag, USAJFKSWCS Group Update, 21. 
45 Sonntag, USAJFKSWCS Group Update, 21 
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national-level decision-making requires broad revision of talent management among the 
Armed Services, including fellowships, civilian education, and assignments that increase 
understanding of interagency decision-making processes, as well as alliances and 
coalitions.”46 Currently, promotable captains or junior majors have only four options to 
obtain an advanced degree including attending NPS or the National Defense University in 
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; simultaneously attending graduate school while attending 
CGSC; or the very limited chance of receiving highly competitive Olmstead or Downing 
scholarships. Only if a service member chose the option to utilize the graduate school 
additional service obligation (GRADSO) upon commission into the military would they 
have the GRADSO option, meaning a person would not be afforded that option later in 
their career. Previously, only officer candidates at their commissioning source of Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), or the United States 
Military Academy at West Point (USMA) could choose this option. 
Creating an additional obstacle, in August 2019, USASOC presented an initiative 
to send a minimum of 51% of all resident-select SF officers to CGSC. This initiative is 
moving the regiment in the wrong direction if it means to accord with the 2018 NDS: 
Professional Military Education (PME) has stagnated and has focused more 
on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and 
ingenuity. We will emphasize intellectual leadership and military 
professionalism in the art and science of warfighting, deepening our 
knowledge of history while embracing new technology and techniques to 
counter competitors. PME will emphasize independence of action in 
warfighting concepts to lessen the impact of degraded/lost communications 
in combat. PME is to be used as a strategic asset to build trust and 
interoperability across the Joint Forces and with allied and partner forces.47  
Following 2018 NDS guidance, the regiment can accomplish multiple objectives. First, 
broadly educated field grade officers returning to the regiment will likely spur ingenuity 
and innovation, providing an asset to commanders in complex problem solvers. By sending 
                                                 
46 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, D.C.: January 2018), 8 
47 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, D.C.: January 2018), 8 
21 
young officers to different educational institutions, the organization will have master’s 
level experts in an array of subjects and disciplines, field grade officers ready to solve 
complex problems with various critical-thinking-heavy approaches. 
While the decision to send the majority of officers to CGSC will undoubtably 
positively impact the art and science of warfighting in the conventional military context, it 
may mean a decrease in ingenuity and innovation. Currently, NPS is the best option for 
those officers looking to further their knowledge base, expand their understanding of the 
joint environment, and research the complexity of our nation’s dynamic national defense 
priorities. NPS President Dr. Ann Elisabeth Rondeau recently stated that graduates from 
NPS are people “who ask fundamentally different questions about the nature of Global 
Competition, think differently about the application of the military instrument, and can 
effectively lead the Joint Force under the conditions of ambiguity [that] is commonly below 
the threshold of large scale operations.”48 To support the 2018 NDS’s goals and U.S. 
strategy more generally, we need more professional innovative, ingenuitive military 
strategists, not less.  
A. EDUCATION AS A RETENTION TOOL 
Following DOPMA guidelines, the timeline for SF officers to attend ILE directly 
aligns with the expiration of the service obligation that an officer accrues after the 
completion of the SFQC. For many Captains, this point in time will be the one where they 
decide whether or not to transition out of the military. The 163 officers who completed the 
H4D survey represent 53% of the total population of 306 active duty year group’s 2009, 
10, and 11.49 Figure 2 depicts the 153 responses to the question of which ILE option they 
selected or will select. Sixty-six percent selected NPS as their top selection.  
                                                 
48 Naval Postgraduate School, “An Operator’s Perspective. Leveraging Education for SOF 
Advantage,” January, 2019, 3. 
49 Simmons, “A Special Report,” 5. 
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Figure 2. Intermediate Level Education Preferences50 
The next question, shown in Figure 3, regards the reason for the selection and 
supports this thesis’s argument; of the 145 responses, 108 selected “earning a respected 
degree” as their top choice.  
                                                 




Figure 3. Determining Factors for ILE Preference51 
                                                 




The next top four selections—“venue location,” “critical thinking skills 
improvement,” “family time,” and “problem-solving skills improvement” —also support 
using education as a retention tool. Senior military leaders are often critiqued as being 
disconnected from the views of the force; obviously, leadership decisions have lasting 
impacts on the regiment as a whole and thus require great care. Special Forces Captains 
and Majors make up a majority of the SF regiment’s officer population in the SF regiment; 
thus, leaders would be wise to take steps—even those that are hard, that cost a bit more, or 
that do not align perfectly with their views—that offer the highest return on investment for 
the good of the force. The human capital investment is the most important aspect of the 
Special Forces Regiment, vastly more so than any piece of equipment, and education is the 
foundation of the civilian workforce, which makes innovative strides well past that of the 
military. The DOD even leverages civilian corporations to solve complex problems for 
them. So why, given the NDAA authorization and a need specifically called for in the 2018 
NDS, would the regiment seek to do anything other than expand educational opportunities 
for its current and future leaders and decision-makers?  
Additionally, concerning the initiative to require 51% of resident select officers to 
attend ILE at the CGSC, Figure 4 shows a negative impact to the force.  
25 
 
Figure 4. Effects of ILE Changes52 
Of the 151 officers who answered the question, 44% stated that the decision would 
“completely negatively” affect their decision to continue to serve the regiment as a field 
grade officer. Another 30% stated that the decision would “largely negatively” impact their 
decision, and only 2% total answered either “largely positively” or “completely positively.” 
Although the survey is limited to three-year groups of officers, the survey clearly shows 
that, if the regiment continues toward this policy change, talented officers will likely leave 
the force to pursue other career opportunities. Leaders would be well-advised to analyze 
true costs and consider other solutions to retaining top talent, especially so that captains 
who are serving as detachment commanders today will be battalion commanders and senior 
leaders in the next 6–10 years.  
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The current system for identifying top talented officers is the officer evaluation 
report (OER), a subjective model. As Tim Kain points out, OERs are often inflated.53  Peer 
evaluations are often utilized as a good measure of performance. Throughout the entire SF 
qualification course, peer evaluations are utilized as a tool to identify those that are top 
performers as well as those who are not seen as “behind the scenes” quality officers.  
Figure 5 shows a critical point: many current junior leaders perceive that the highest-quality 
and talented captains, their peers, are not being retained for future service as battalion 
commanders and senior leaders.  
 
 
Figure 5. SF Regiment Talent Retention.54 (Continued on next 
page.) 
                                                 
53 Kane, Bleeding Talent, 85. 




Figure 5 (continued from previous page) 
 
Of the 153 respondents, 128 answered “absolutely no” or “probably no” as to 
whether the regiment is retaining the highest-quality captains who will serve as battalion 
commanders. Responses to questions 10, 11, and 12 demonstrate reasoning for the question 
14 responses and show that TM is essential for the future of the force. The SF Regiment 
can leverage every means possible to retain the highest-quality officers. ODAs, the 
foundation of Special Forces, deserve leaders for top performance, and the regiment can 
strive to implement policies that will increase retention of high-quality officers, more even 
than there exist billets to place them. Having analyzed the survey results, this thesis’s 
researchers posit that, yes, affording the best officers with opportunities to attend advanced 
degree institutions as part of ILE will increase retention.  
  
28 
B. THE GRADSO 
The Army GRADSO policy guarantees that an officer can attend a civilian 
university to attain a graduate degree if agreeing at the time of commission to an additional 
service obligation of three years to every one year spent in the program; however, the Army 
has currently suspended the GRADSO program for the 2014 and beyond year groups 
pending officer corps reshaping efforts.55 Future SF captains will, therefore, not be 
afforded this opportunity. Since earning a respected master’s degree is one of the top 
priorities of current captains, a GRADSO for only the top-performing officers may well 
bolster retention of the highest performing officers, who would then remain in the regiment 
until the 16-year mark of their career. 
Significantly, according to the July 2019 SF Branch Update, there may not be 
enough post-ILE Majors available for assignment at the operational Groups and the talent 
bench for future battalion commanders for years to come may be decimated.56 Offering 
GRADSOs to top-performing officers would likely increase retention:  
The march of the current up-or-out promotion system means that it is 
difficult for non-accessions branches (like SF) to solve production gaps 
after they’ve occurred. Our current active duty officer (ADO) shortfall is 
merely the first act of what will likely be years of small 18-series year 
groups…year groups ‘09, ‘10, ‘11, ‘12, and ‘13 will all, SF Branch assesses, 
fall short of what is deemed a ‘healthy’ post-ILE cohort of SF majors that 
allows the branch to fill all 18A O-4 SF Group billets (plus some), as well 
as USAJFKSWCS, interagency, and billets in conventional force (CF) units 
across the Army. Absent significant reform, SF Branch will, starting next 
year, be institutionally obligated to fill CF headquarters billets with SF 
majors at the expense of the operational Groups, decreasing the raw number 
of majors assigned to each SF Group while significantly constraining the 
Regiment’s talent bench for battalion commanders (and beyond) for years 
to come.57 
Figure 6 depicts the problems inherent in the year groups versus goals.  
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Figure 6. Totals of SF-Controlled Officers by Year Group as 
of May 201958 
C. UNDESIRABLE ASSIGNMENTS 
The GRADSO option could also be offered to those Captains who are selected to 
serve in an undesirable assignment. According to the H4D summary, location assignments 
had a heavy impact on retention.59 Senior captains who are post ODA command time are 
often pulled to fill mandatory billets that are not always at a desirable location or otherwise 
negatively impact the officer’s family. With ILE already forcing a permanent change in 
station (PCS), the timeline of these assignments is often more than the service member is 
willing to accept. The primary example is an assignment at the Joint Readiness Training 
                                                 
58 Simmons, Green Beret O-3 Talent Management – FEB19 Survey. 
59 Dan Warner et al., The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management, 28. 
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Center located at Ft. Polk, Louisiana. According to the H4D summary’s anecdotal 
discussion with current SF officers, “all six of the most recently selected captains who were 
assigned to move to Ft. Polk are leaving the service.”60 The summary offered three main 
reasons why the assignment is problematic: “first, it is in a remote location that most 
individuals do not desire to live. Secondly, its remoteness impacts the service member’s 
family and their spouse’s career. Third, the job at Ft. Polk is viewed by Captains as 
providing little to no benefit to the Army, the SF Regiment, or the service member 
themselves.” When these reasons coincide with a natural transition point, they become that 
much more significant and that much more likely to negatively impact retention.  
In addition to offering a GRADSO to those at the top of the order of merit list 
(OML), GRADSOs could be extended to those who have been identified as moving to Ft. 
Polk or other stations that HRC designates as undesirable. Had they done so, they may well 
have had six more captains who would have become field grade officers.  
D. CREDENTIALING INTERMEDIATE LEVEL EDUCATION 
On 22 October 2018, General Stephen Townsend, Commander of Training and 
Doctrine Command, sent an official memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Army on ILE 
Credentialing, communicating the current situation and his concern as well as his 
recommendation for a solution going forward. Section D focuses on the General’s 
memorandum and the directive that followed, highlighting some of the disconnect between  
the consensus of the General Officers and field grade officers currently serving in the SF 
Regiment. This is based off the comments received in the survey of active duty SF officers, 
conducted by the SF HRC Future Readiness Officer. General Townsend’s memorandum 
summarizes the following:   
1. Situation. Too many of our Army field grade officers are graduating from 
non-warfighting academic programs, receiving Advanced Operations Course 
(AOC) credit without the education, and entering their most important key 
and developmental positions without learning the fundamentals of large-scale 
ground combat operations at the organizational level. Meanwhile, the staff 
groups at CGSC suffer from suboptimal small group distribution (lack of 
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operations and intelligence officers and too many special branch and 
functional officers). The siphoning of talented basic branch officers to these 
programs limits the level of warfighting focus rigor in the small groups. 
Worse, to fill the empty seats at CGSC, we send scores of officers who were 
not board selected for the resident course.61 
General Townsend highlights that officers who applied for and were selected to attend 
“non-warfighting” academic programs do not obtain the proper education to serve as field 
grade officers operating at the organizational levels.  
 The problem does not seem to be actually about the other institutions; rather, the 
problem seems to be that CGSC does not, as is, have the necessary rigor. The memorandum 
highlights a key factor in the decision to not grant AOC credit to academic institutions 
outside of CGSC: the staff groups at CGSC suffer from suboptimal small group 
distribution. “The siphoning of talented basic branch officers to these programs limits the 
level of warfighting focus rigor in the small groups. Worse, to  fill the empty seats at CGSC, 
we send scores of officers who were not board selected for the resident course.”62 
Seemingly, the problem lies then not with other academic institutions but, rather, with 
talented officers, specifically Special Forces Officers, going elsewhere, bringing down 
CGSC’s “warfighting focus rigor” by lessening the group’s experience. In a way, then, not 
only does that not bode well for the Captains that need a rigorous environment to challenge 
them to solve complex problems, the general’s argument seems to validate this thesis’s 
point that diverse experiences are fundamentally important to the warfighter and encourage 
attendance in more than one environment to strengthen the regiment as a whole.  
 Additionally, the memorandum’s miscommunication regarding AOC credit will 
likely cause problems. 
2. Recommendation. By approving the attached directive to rescind AOC 
credit for the non-warfighting programs and prioritizing functional area and 
specialty branches to Satellite CGSC, HRC will be able to send enough basic 
branch officers to the resident CGSC course to achieve the synergy required 
to achieve the outcomes that commanders expect from their FG officers. 
These changes restore the CGSC experience to a level required to meet the 
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demands of large-scale combat operations against a near-peer adversary IAW 
the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Our plan is to make a partial course 
correction this academic year and a full correction by AV 20–21.63 
Rescinding credit for schools including NPS does not work when they never granted AOC 
credit64 directly in the first place.  
Figure 4 (previously shown) also shows that, of the 151 respondents, most officers 
would negatively perceive this decision. Forty-four percent stated that the decision would 
“completely negatively” affect their decision to continue to serve the regiment as a field 
grade officer, and another 30% stated the decision would “largely negatively” impact their 
decision. Again, only a total of 2% answered that the decision would positively impact 
their retention decision. Senior Special Forces can communicate the potential detriment to 
senior Army officials and to the Secretary of the Army.  
Further, the memorandum goes on to recommend an increased number of programs 
at the CGSC, which would seem to contradict the idea of having larger, more diverse 
groups.  
3. At the 4-Star General Officer Conference on 27 September 2018, I 
presented these findings and the proposed changes recommended by the 
Combined Arms Center Commanding General and Army University. All our 
4-stars concurred and supported the proposal. The CSA also concurred but 
directed we answer five questions before final approval. The questions and 
answers follow:65 
Question 1. Will this fix swing the pendulum too far? No: starting next 
summer, broadening and Master’s Programs will still be filled with the same 
quality of officers. For basic branch officers that participate in other 
broadening programs in the future, they will either. attend satellite intimidate 
Level Education and AOC via Distance Learning or attend resident CGSC 
after the broadening program. The option selected is determined by HRC 
based on the officer’s timeline to ensure they have adequate time to complete 
two KD positions prior to their CSL board. In future selection boards 
(Academic Year 21 and beyond), DMPM (DA G1) will establish 
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64 Esper, Mark T. Army Directive 2019-19. 29 May 2019. Section 3a. 
65 Stephen J. Townsend, section 3. 
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objectives to ensure we select the right quality and branch distribution 
to meet all requirements.66 
The recommendation does not seem, therefore, likely to achieve its own goal to avoid 
filling empty seats with board-selected students. The small group problem becoming larger 
would be exacerbated within the SF Branch where the number of captains is much lower 
than that of the conventional force. The HRC survey makes clear that Captains desire 
opportunities to advance their education and to improve their critical thinking skills, so 
taking away those opportunities will likely cause an exodus of captains that may well have 
otherwise remained in the service. Therefore, in the upcoming years, if the survey data 
stands true, the regiment will experience a significant loss of talent and potentially an even 
worse critical shortage of majors to fill mandated billets. Worse, the loss will likely result 
in a snowball effect, decreasing force readiness across all Special Forces Groups. 
 The memorandum also considers whether the decision to send more officers to 
CGSC will disadvantage officers or damage relationships with the other academic 
institutions; it posits that it will not due largely due to satellite options.  
Question 2. Will we disadvantage officers already in these programs? 
No; all officers currently in these programs will be grandfathered IAW 
the Army Directive.67 
Question 3: Will we damage the relationships with some of these 
educational institutions? No; we will still fill programs with same 
number and level of quality officers. For the OCLL, Olmsted, and JCS 
Intern programs, HRC will still select and send the exact same 
distribution of officers by quality and branch. Since OCLL, JCS, and 
Olmsted candidates are selected prior to being promotable. there is time 
for them to still attend resident CGSC after completion of the program 
and prior to follow on KD positions. If their timeline does not support 
resident CGSC, they will complete resident satellite and AOC via DL 
For other broadening programs (NPS, NDU, WM, etc.), HRC will still 
select the same level of quality officers but use these programs for a 
resident experience for a greater number of specialty and functional 
officers where it can serve as their credentialing course when coupled 
with Satellite ILE. The shorter Satellite 1LE without AOC was 
developed and originally intended for Specialty and Functional Area 
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Officers-we will go back to primarily targeting these populations for 
satellite attendance. 
Question 4: Will we send lower quality officers to the fellowships? No; 
as outlined above, we can still send our top-quality officers from the 
basic branches, functional areas, and specialty branches to the various 
programs. However, for basic branch officers, they will have to attend 
CGSC resident after the program or complete the credentialing 
requirement through AOC DL. 
Question 5: Can we expand satellite ILE to include AOC? Not 
recommended; if AOC were added to the Satellite course it would be 
almost the same length as the resident course and would require 
significant instructor and facility increases. This is expensive and of 
little benefit since we have the required capacity at the resident course 
at Fort Leavenworth and it would not save officers any appreciable 
time.68 
However, that does not address the major concern of decreased family time. For an 
officer to successfully complete the mandated resident CGSC or satellite course following 
the completion of a broadening program or fellowship, he must PCS with their family 
multiple times over a relatively short period of time. This directive does not take into 
account spouses’ careers or the inconvenience and burden placed on the service member 
if, for instance, they will need to remove their children from school mid-year to complete 
the mandated CGSC requirement.  
I fully support this initiative. Re-balancing the right officers in the right 
PME is a critical step to restoring intermediate level PME to meet the 
warfighting rigor required to defeat near peer threats in MOO. With this 
shift, we will also lead the Joint Force in meeting the PME requirements 
outlined in the National Defense Strategy.69 
Despite critical concerns, Army Directive 2019–19 (Credentialing Intermediate Education) 
was published on 28 May 2019, signed by now Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper, 
making the general’s recommendations policy and making it more important than ever that 
regiment leadership examines closely the potential negative impacts on the future of the 
force. 
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Consistently tasked with being problem solvers in all areas of U.S. foreign policy, 
special forces officers need the best education possible, and the United States needs the 
most talented SOF force it can possibly achieve. Crucially, while the consensus of the 
General Officers that all army officers should attend ILE at CGSC to “meet the warfighting 
rigor required to defeat near peer threats in modern day operations” is nested in the idea 
that warfighting is straightforward and requires only the education provided by army 
doctrine, leaders need to consider that, because warfighting in SOF happens across all 
domains, diplomatic, information, military, and economic, having officers with diverse 
educational backgrounds provides senior officers with complex problem solvers capable 
of adapting to the multitude of current and future potential threats. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 This thesis finds that, yes, education is a key to retention of Special Forces Captains, 
and that, yes, the words of Special Forces Captains themselves have both demonstrated the 
retention problem and also pointed the way to a solution: increased civilian education 
opportunities particularly through GRADSO. One hundred and sixty-three Special Forces 
Captains from the First Special Forces Command (Airborne), composed of year groups 
2009–2011, responded to a workforce sentiment survey sent out by the Special Forces 
Regiment Future Readiness Officer in 2019. Researchers from a Designing for Defense 
team, part of Hacking for Defense (H4D) reviewed the results as did internal personnel 
throughout the Special Forces Regiment. Although the Special Forces Captains gave a vast 
array of reasons as to why they may exit the Army, three common themes stood out: they 
almost universally greed on a perceived lack of time on an ODA as a Detachment 
Commander, they highlighted a lack of mentorship from senior officers that contributed to 
confusion, and they  described an aversion to being forced the U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) in order to attain AOC credit. 
If left unchecked, the low rate of retention among Special Forces Captains could 
likely decimate the quantity and greatly reduce the quality of available field grade officers 
within the Special Forces Regiment. With the 2018 NDS and NSS both noting the great 
power competition as a primary U.S. national security concern, the 1st Special Forces 
Command needs not only the required number of strategic and analytical thinkers but also 
requires the best. Fortunately, the Special Forces Regiment is now in a better position than 
ever before to listen to its junior officers and make the necessary changes to turn the tide 
of departing captains. 
A. TIME TO MAKE CHANGES 
 MG Sonntag’s recent initiative to shorten the Special Forces Qualification Course 
(SFQC) could not have come at a more beneficial time. By compressing the course from 
approximately two years to under one-year, Special Forces Captains will now have, on 
average, 5.5 years at their first Special Forces Group duty station as opposed to only four 
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years. The increased time at Group provides the opportunity for the 1st Special Forces 
Command to address all three of the top reasons that Special Forces Captains gave as 
reasons for potential attrition. By taking advantage of the additional time, the Special 
Forces Regiment can solve its retention problem among captains, improve the quality of 
its captains, and, in turn, better ready its future senior leadership. Taking advantage of the 
time provided directly aligns with the NSS and NDS goals to improve force readiness by 
molding refined critical thinkers and problem solvers. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Special Forces Captains must remain on an ODA as a Detachment 
Commander for longer than the average 18–24 months. Not only do Special Forces 
Captains enjoy this position more than any other, but, as a Detachment Commander, junior 
officers learn the most, likely gaining the operational experience that will serve them well 
as field grade officers within the Special Forces Regiment. Now having 5.5 years at their 
initial tour of a Special Forces Group, DOPMA no longer limits a Detachment Commander 
to 18–24 months on a team. Three years as a Detachment Commander is not only feasible, 
but will lead to more experienced Detachment Commanders as well as more capable 
ODAs. 
The Special Forces Regiment must better ensure that Company and Battalion 
leadership mentor junior officers. Multiple Special Forces Captains noted in the survey 
that they had rarely or never been counseled by their rater or senior rater, which is 
unacceptable not least because it leads to confusion about future opportunities. The 
increased timeline during Captains’ initial tours inherently allows for improved 
mentorship, but leadership needs to put a solid plan into place that ensures this mentorship. 
Initial, quarterly, and OER counseling must occur for all Special Forces Captains. 
Special Forces Captains need increased, not lessened, opportunities to earn 
postgraduate education. The ongoing push for 51% of resident-select O-4s to attend 
CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth is not only contributing to Special Forces Captains exiting the 
Army, but also limiting officers’ abilities for advanced education to align with the 2018 
NDS guidance. Within its talent management section of “Build a More Lethal Force,” the 
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NDS states that “developing leaders who are competent in national-level decision-making 
requires broad revision of talent management among the Armed Services, including 
fellowships, civilian education, and assignments that increase understanding of interagency 
decision-making processes, as well as alliances and coalitions.”70 Following the NDS 
guidance requires allowing top performing captains graduate school options, not forcing 
them to attend a “one size fits all” intermediate level education at CGSC. Fortunately, the 
5.5 years that a Special Forces Captain will now have at group allows the time for several 
civilian education options while still ensuring officer AOC credentialing.  
This thesis highly recommends that the Special Forces Regiment leverage NDS 
and NDAA to create a GRADSO program as a way to increase retention of Special 
Forces Captains while ensuring force readiness in a dynamic and complex global 
environment. Considering the survey results, allowing top performing captains to obtain 
an advanced civilian education will increase the retention of those officers who may 
otherwise choose to leave the army in pursuit of an advanced degree. Also, the United 
States within the near-peer threat environment, specifically concerning the Special Forces 
Regiment, would greatly benefit from having officers who are complex problem solvers. 
By having field grade officers with diverse educational backgrounds, Commanders will 
have the ability to pull from various expertise and, therefore, solve complex problems 
through multiple avenues of thought.  
Future research on this topic may also highly benefit the regiment. Of particular 
interest, future researchers could consider how the policy changes to Advanced Operations 
Credit will affect current institutions of higher education such as NPS. Also, how has the 
SF Regiment been able to take advantage of the increased amount of time that its captains 
now have at their initial tour of an SF Group?  Have these captains been able to earn 
master’s degrees from civilian or military institutions prior to or in conjunction with ILE?  
If possible, a similar survey should be sent out to YG 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 officers 
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to assess their outlook on career stability and their career as a field grade officer within the 
SF Regiment.  
Overall, increasing graduate opportunities for Special Forces Captains and paying 
attention to how they utilize those opportunities, creating mentorship guidelines and 
studying the effects, and ensuring the most operational experience possible will all aid in 
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